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We study a choice made by over 20,000 U.S. military personnel annually be-
tween the High-3 and Redux retirement plans. Compared to High-3, Redux offers a
$30,000 current lump sum payment in exchange for lower future annuity payments.
Despite break-even discount rates between 10% and 25%, about 40% of individuals
chose Redux. The likelihood of choosing Redux is decreasing with the break-even
discount rate and is related to individual demographics. The implied personal dis-
count rates from this choice are around 9.2%, much lower than found previously.
Offering this choice has already saved the government over $2 billion in future re-
tirement payments.
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1 Introduction
We study a real retirement choice made by members of the U.S. military which in-
volves large sums of money. Individuals retiring prior to 1986 had no choice concerning
their retirement: if they served for 20 years, they would receive a generous defined benefit
annuity referred to as High-3. However, the costs of this system have been large and are
growing (Defense Business Board, 2011). For example, military retirement payments in
FY 2012 were $52.2 billion and are expected to rise to $116.9 billion by 2035 (Office
of the Actuary, 2013). In response to these rising costs, the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 2000 allowed members to make a choice between the High-3 plan and the
Redux plan. Under Redux, service members receive a $30,000 lump sum payment in
exchange for future payments that are lower than those under High-3. The different struc-
ture of these retirement plans yields large differences in the present value of retirement
payments. For instance, with a discount rate of 5 percent per year, the present value of
High-3 over Redux for a representative officer can easily exceed $110,000, while it can
be more than $60,000 for a representative enlisted service member.
Is the choice of Redux optimal from the individual’s point of view? In this paper, we
provide the first evidence on who takes Redux over High-3, which allows us to shed some
light on whether optimal decisions are being made. We use personnel data from the mili-
tary on close to 80,000 enlisted personnel and 9,000 officers who made the Redux/High-3
choice since 2001 and, under minimal assumptions, we calculate after-tax break-even dis-
count rates (the discount rate that equates the present value of both streams of payments
and which can be considered as a proxy for the disadvantage of Redux) between roughly
10 and 25 percent, with an overall mean of 13 percent. Despite these high break-even
rates, we find that more than 40% of military personnel have chosen Redux.
The likelihood of choosing Redux, however, is decreasing with the break-even dis-
count rate, which is consistent with service members making informed decisions. Fur-
thermore, the probability of choosing Redux is negatively related to being female, being
an officer, age, educational attainment, being single. Selecting Redux is positively related
to being Black, the number of dependents, and being divorced. These results are in line
with previous findings in the literature, in particular the 2001 study by Warner and Pleeter
analyzing the choices between an annuity and a lump-sum payment of 66,000 service
members eligible for early separation from military service.
Understanding the factors affecting personal financial choices has important implica-
tions for public policy, such as in the design of retention policies and retirement plans. A
large benefit of our study is that it involves real (as opposed to hypothetical) choices made
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by military personnel over substantial amounts of money. Simple calculations show that
introducing the possibility to choose Redux has saved the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) more than $2 billion ($5 billion) in retirement payments assuming a yearly interest
rate of 5% (2%), at the same time that it has allowed service members to choose income
streams that better fit their personal financial tastes. Furthermore, the DoD is presently
studying different alternatives to overhaul the current retirement system, and any change
that involves individual choice can be informed by our results (Defense Business Board,
2011).
It is also important to note that the demographic make-up of the military is broadly
comparable to that of both the broad public sector and the private sector, and so our
findings may be useful in the formulation of savings and retirement plans for those popu-
lations. For example, the Redux versus High-3 decision is of a simliar nature to the choice
of when to claim Social Security payments (e.g., Coile et al. (2002)), or whether or not to
purchase an annuity (e.g., Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)).
We close our paper by using the retirement choice to estimate personal discount rates
(that is, the rate at which individuals are willing to exchange future for current consump-
tion). By using a model in the spirit of Warner and Pleeter (2001), we find that the
military force as a whole exhibits personal discount rates around 9 percent (10.05 per-
cent for enlisted members and 6.49 percent for officers); however, these results are lower
than the discount rates reported in the literature. For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001)
find that most military personnel exhibited personal discount rates of 18 percent or more,
and Harrison et al. (2002) perform a field experiment in Denmark involving real economic
commitments and find an overall personal discount rate of 28.1 percent. The low personal
discount rates that we find, broadly comparable with market interest rates, lend support to
the idea that individuals are not making gross mistakes by choosing Redux over High-3.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 details the Redux and
High-3 plans and the differences between them, while Section 3 discusses the decision
making process the individual faces. Section 4 summarizes the data and our empirical
sample. The estimated relationships between the retirement choice and personal char-
acteristics are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 discusses the results on estimated
personal discount rates. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Retirement Choice in the U.S. Military
2.1 The High-3 and Redux retirement plans
The current military retirement system is a defined benefit plan where service mem-
bers do not make any contributions. However, eligibility for the retirement pension (i.e.,
vesting) occurs only after 20 years of service (YOS); if a service member leaves before
20 YOS, they receive no pension.1 Service members who joined the military after July
31, 1986 are required to choose between two retirement plans, High-3 and Redux, when
they reach 15 YOS.2
Under the High-3 formula, retirement payments are a function of the number of YOS
and the average of the highest 36 months of basic pay during the individual’s service.3,4
Specifically, High-3 retirees receive 2.5 percent of this “high-3” basic pay for each year
of service, adjusted for inflation with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For example, a
retiree with 20 YOS receives 50 percent of her “high-3” basic pay.
The Redux formula is similar to High-3, except that choosing Redux entitles the ser-
vice member to a lump sum payment of $30,000 called the Career Status Bonus (CSB) in
exchange for lower future annuity payments than under the High-3 plan.5,6 Specifically,
as with High-3, retirement payments under Redux are based on the highest 36 months of
1In addition to the pension, service members have the option to contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan, a
tax-deferred savings account sponsored by the federal government.
2Service members who entered service before August 1, 1986 do not make a retirement choice, but are
automatically subject to either the High-3 plan (if they joined between September 8, 1980 and July 31,
1986) or the Final Basic Pay plan (if they joined before September 8, 1980). The Final Basic Pay plan is
identical to the High-3 plan except that the 2.5 percent per year multiplier is applied to the service member’s
basic pay in the final month of service.
3Basic pay in the military is purely a function of years of experience and rank, so aside from the rare
instances of reduction in rank, the highest 36 months of basic pay are generally the last 36 months served.
4The various allowances that military members receive (such as those for housing, meals, and clothing)
are not included in basic pay and thus, under both Redux and High-3, allowances do not affect retirement
annuity payments.
5Those who choose Redux agree to complete 20 YOS and are obligated to return the proportionate share
of the bonus if they leave the force before that period. High-3 does not have a similar clause requiring an
additional 5 year commitment, however, as we discuss below, quit rates for service members with between
15 and 20 YOS under any retirement plan are negligible, reflecting the fact that quitting entails forefitting
the sizable pension.
6The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 directed that members joining the force after July 31,
1986 would be under the Redux formula, without the $30,000 Career Status Bonus. However, this act
was repealed in 1999 (i.e., 7 years before the first retirement under Redux) due, in part, to the perceived
inequities it was introducing in the retirement system. The repeal of the Military Retirement Reform Act
of 1986 included a stipulation that service members could choose between the either the High-3 formula
or the Redux formula plus the Career Status Bonus. It is not clear where the term “Redux” originated (for
example, it is not used in the legistation which authorizes the retirement formula). Shafer (2000) speculates
it was coined by military personnel bitter about the reduction in their retirement benefits relative to the
High-3 plan.
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basic pay during the service member’s career. However, the multiplier is only 2 percent
for each of the first 20 YOS (compared to the 2.5 percent under High-3). After 20 YOS,
the multiplier increases to 3.5 percent for each year of service up to year 30, when it fi-
nally decreases to 2.5 percent for each year of service. Redux payments are also adjusted
for inflation; however, the adjustment is based on the CPI minus 1 percent, so is less
generous than under High-3. Furthermore, when a retiree under the Redux plan turns 62
years old, Redux payments are equalized to what they would be under High-3. However,
because Redux payments are adjusted for inflation at a lower rate than High-3 payments,
Redux payments once again are smaller than High-3 payments after the age of 62.
In summary, for service members who retire with less than 30 YOS, the Redux pay-
ments only equal High-3 payments when the retiree turns 62 years old. On the contrary,
for those who retire with 30 or more YOS, payments under both retirement plans are
equal during the first year of retirement and when the retiree turns 62 years old. In all
other times, High-3 payments exceed Redux payments because of the higher multiplier
and/or greater inflation adjustment. Table 1 compares the multipliers obtained by indi-
viduals under the High-3 and Redux. For instance, a service member retiring at 20 YOS
under High-3 (Redux) receives 50% (40%) of her “high-3” basic pay. As another exam-
ple, if she retires at 30 YOS, she gets a monthly payment of 75% of her “high-3” basic
pay under both retirement plans. It is clear from the table that the difference between the
two retirement formulas, in terms of multipliers, is greatest for those retiring at 20 YOS.
Overall, Redux penalizes more those who retire as soon as possible (i.e., at 20 YOS),
those with higher rank (i.e., those with a larger basic pay at the moment of retirement),
and those who end up living longer (because they are subject to lower payments for a
longer time).
2.2 The choice
When service members reach 14 and a half YOS, they receive an email stating that
they are currently under the High-3 formula, but may choose the Redux formula and thus
receive the $30,000 Career Status Bonus at 15 YOS.7 All service members are required
to meet with their supervisor, discuss the options, and then print, sign, and date a form
stating their desired choice. The decision must be made before 15 YOS are reached,
and the decision is irrevocable. As in non-military labor market settings, the presence of
defaults is interesting in our context (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Beshears et al., 2009). On
one hand, the email service members receive implies that High-3 is the “default” option,
and aversion to change may prompt individuals to choose High-3. On the other hand,
7An email sent to a service member in November, 2012 can be seen at:
http://faculty.nps.edu/jcunha/redux high3 email.pdf
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service members are required to make an active choice, so we may think that a stated
“default” would not have as much influence on the decision as in other contexts.
The email service members receive describes the main features of both plans, and
highlights the differences between them, including the lump sum payment, the differ-
ential multipliers and inflation factors, and the equalization of payments at 62 years old.
The email strongly encourages members to discuss the decision with other people, such as
financial advisors, colleagues, and supervisors, and to consult various documents avail-
able on DoD websites, such as interactive retirement calculators. The email explicitly
suggests investigating the website of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), which con-
tains several articles comparing the two retirement options. Some of these articles (e.g.,
Hattiangadi et al. (2013)) are openly in favor of the High-3 plan, showing simple exam-
ples which demonstrate that Redux annuity payments are lower than High-3 payments,
and discussing the ways in which the $30,000 lump sum bonus can be substituted with
a private sector loan. Other articles (e.g., Shafer (2000)) explicitly advocate the Redux
plan, claiming that choosing Redux and investing the $30,000 bonus may in fact be more
beneficial than the higher annuity payments under the High-3 plan.
2.3 Break-Even Discount Rates
The fundamental tension between these two opposing arguments surrounds the present
value of the two streams of payments, and the break-even discount rate that equates them.
The present value of each retirement plan is given by:
High-3













(1  t2)Monthly Payment Reduxt
(1+ r)t
(2)
where r is the monthly discount rate, m is the number of months from the date of the
retirement decision (i.e., 15 YOS) to the first retirement payment, n is the number of
monthly payments during retirement, t1 is the tax rate applied to the Redux lump sum,
and t2 is the tax rate applied to the monthly payments. The break-even discount rate is the
value of r that equates equation (1) to equation (2).
Basic pay in the military is determined uniquely by rank and YOS, so rank and YOS
at retirement are the only two factors differentially influencing the two annuity payments.
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These formulas demonstrate that because the lump sum bonus does not vary, the larger
is basic pay, the more is sacrificed in future annuity payments under Redux compared to
High-3. To demonstrate the difference between the two formulas more concretely, we
calculate the difference in present values and the break-even discount rates for represen-
tative service members of various ranks. Specifically, we assume personnel retire at 20
YOS (m= 60) and have a life expectancy of 79 years, and we consider a service member
with the average age in the given rank.
Furthermore, as we do not know if individuals currently have additional family income
nor do we know what their post-retirement income will be, we must make an assumption
on the tax rates service members will face on the lump sum and the annuity payments.
We use the following tax rates which a married service member with no additional family
income would face: t1, the marginal tax rate applied to the Redux bonus, is 25 percent
for enlisted service members and 28 percent for officers, and t2, the effective tax rate on
monthly payments, is 15 percent for enlisted personnel and 20 percent for officers. In
unreported analysis, we find that the estimated break-even discount rates are quite robust
to small changes in the tax rates.
Table 2 summarizes this exercise. Consider an officer with rank O-4 at the time of
retirement. In our dataset, there are 4,808 officers retiring with rank O-4 amongst whom
the average age at 20 YOS is 42.52 years. An officer with this average age faces a break-
even discount rate of 18.9 percent; at a discount rate of 5 percent, the present value of
High-3 exceeds that of Redux by $117,719, while at a discount rate of 20 percent, the
present value of Redux exceeds that of High-3 by $3,828. As another example, amongst
the 38,301 enlisted personnel who retired with a rank of E-7, the average age at 20 YOS is
40.07 years and the break-even discount rate is 15.1 percent. For these E-7s, the difference
in present value of High-3 over Redux is $68,749 under a 5 percent discount rate, while
it is -$13,148 under a 20 percent discount rate. Finally, the last column shows that the
break-even discount rate increases with rank, reflecting the fact that salaries increase with
rank. It is also clear that officers face higher break-even discount rates than do enlisted
personnel, which is a consequence of their higher salaries.
3 Personal Discount Rates and Demographics
The traditional model of intertemporal choice provides us with a theoretical frame-
work to study the High-3 versus Redux decision. In one extreme, service members face
the same borrowing and lending rate and can use a frictionless capital market to replicate
any desired stream of payments. In this scenario, individuals would calculate the present
value of each alternative, discounting at the market interest rate, and would choose the
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retirement plan with the highest present value. Because markets are perfect and fric-
tionless, this course of action would be optimal for any set of preferences and personal
discount rate. For example, if High-3 has a higher present value at the current market
rate but the service member wants the $30,000 bonus at 15 YOS, she could easily bor-
row that amount of money from the bank and choose High-3. Then, she could use the
larger High-3 monthly payments to repay the loan and be better off, independently of her
intertemporal personal tastes.
In the other extreme, service members have no access to capital markets in order to
undertake the aforementioned intertemporal transactions. The choice between High-3
and Redux thus depends entirely on one’s preferences and personal discount rate. For
example, for a risk-neutral individual, if the personal discount rate is below the break-
even discount rate, then High-3 will be preferred over Redux. The opposite will be true if
the personal discount rate is above the break-even discount rate.
In reality, service members have varying degrees of access to capital markets, and we
can not observe this information in our data.8 For this reason, we follow the literature and
assume no access to capital markets (e.g. Warner and Pleeter (2001)). Then, we char-
acterize the differences in demographic characteristics of those choosing the two plans
and, assuming a risk-neutral decision maker, we can back out the personal discount rates
implied by these choices.
To the extent that capital market imperfections obstruct the previous financial trans-
action, the retirement choice and, thus, the personal discount rate, will be associated with
personal characteristics. There is ample evidence in this direction. Gilman (1976) and
Black (1983) find that people with higher levels of education and income, as well as older
individuals, exhibit lower personal discount rates. They also report that Black individuals
seem to have higher personal discount rates than Whites. More recently, Harrison et al.
(2002) find similar evidence for the Danish population. Warner and Pleeter (2001) also
find that personal discount rates decrease with age, and that officers (who generally have
higher income and education) have lower personal discount rates than enlisted personnel.
The factors affecting the relationship between individual demographics and personal
discount rates are difficult to determine. For instance, individuals with higher income
may have better credit scores and the possibility to post collateral when borrowing money,
8Furthermore, there is a feature of the retirement plans that makes the above financial transaction par-
ticularly difficult to instrument in real life. That is, the bonus of $30,000 is received at 15 YOS while, in
both plans, the first monthly payment occurs when retirement begins, which happens at 20 YOS minimum.
This implies the service member should be able to get a $30,000 loan from the bank with the possibility to
start repaying it 5 years (or more) later. Considering the usual loan terms, this repayment structure seems
difficult to achieve for an average person. Possibly, this situation makes service members be closer to the
second extreme case in which they do not have access to capital markets.
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which would imply lower borrowing rates. This easier access to capital markets would
make them exhibit lower personal discount rates. The objective of our paper is not to
identify the factors underlying that association, but to describe how the retirement choice
and personal discount rates relate to personal characteristics.
4 Data and Sample
We obtained retirement choice data from the USmilitary’s personnel database, housed
by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Our sample includes the universe of
retired, active duty military service members in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines
who were (i) required to make a decision between High-3 and Redux, and (ii) retired
with a pension as of October 2012 (the most recent data available). As mentioned above,
service members who enlisted since August 1, 1986 were required to make a retirement
decision at 14.5 YOS; thus we observe decisions that were made starting in August 2001
until October 2007. Several observations (534) are recorded as retiring prior to 20 YOS
or making the retirement choice after 15 YOS; we exclude them as it is not clear whether
this reflects actual behavior or miscoded data. Basic pay (i.e., salary) is published by
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and we append salary at retirement for
each individual. We also add the break-even discount rate computed for each service
member with the assumptions described in Subsection 2.3, except that we now consider
the actual YOS at retirement (i.e., we do not assume the individual retires exactly at 20
YOS). Figure 1 contains box plots with the distributions of break-even discount rates for
service members of various ranks at retirement. The spread of break-even discount rates
within a rank reflects the distribution of ages at retirement, with older people having lower
break-even discount rates because of their fewer expected payments in retirement. Our
final sample contains 88,736 individuals.9
Note that because our sample is only of retired service members who are receiving a
pension, we do not observe members who have not yet retired, but have made a retirement
choice.10 These missing observations comprise two groups: (i) those who quit before 20
YOS and (ii) those who are still working. While we can not measure the size of these
groups in our data, various studies suggest there is a negligible number of service mem-
bers in the first group (e.g., Asch et al. (2013)). This reflects the fact that five or less years
of continued service will vest the sizable pension and quitting will yield no pension. The
9DMDC also collects data from the Coast Guard, but there are very few Coast Guard members who
made the retirement choice (634 members). Interestingly, only one of these Coast Guard members chose
Redux.
10The original election data is stored by the individual services and is not transferred to the DMDC until
the service member retires. We have not been able to access this original election data.
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second group is potentially more problematic for our study, if service members choose
their retirement plan based on their expected date of retirement. We address this issue in
more detail below, and offer evidence that suggests this sample selection issue does not
impede our ability to analyze the determinants of the retirement choice with the sample
at hand.
Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Ten percent
of the sample are officers and, due to the inherent differences between officers and enlisted
personnel, we present summary statistics for the sample as a whole as well as for officers
and enlisted personnel separately.
While 38 percent of service members chose Redux overall, there is a large disparity
across officers and enlisted personnel: 42 percent of enlisted personnel chose Redux and
only 7 percent of officers chose Redux. The average age of those making the retirement
choice is about 35 years old, and officers are slightly older than enlisted personnel, re-
flecting the fact that officers are more likely to have attended college before joining the
military.
Basic military pay is purely a function of rank and years of experience, and is clearly
larger for officers than enlisted personnel.11 Despite their higher age, the break-even
discount rate is larger on average for officers (16.9 percent) than for enlisted members
(12.6 percent), reflecting the much larger salaries of the former.
Relative to the size of the services, the Air Force is over-represented in this sample,
with 29 percent of all service members who made a retirement choice at 15 YOS - this is
partly reflecting the fact that pilots are officers. The distribution across the other services
largely reflects their relative size, with the Marines as the smallest force.
The time period of our data spans two wars (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and the nature
of our modern military implies only a small percentage of the force in specific occupations
can expect to be exposed to combat. Based on conversations with knowledgeable officers,
we encode occupations as either “combat intensive” or not, and find that 11.4 percent of
enlisted personnel and 4.9 percent of officers are in such fields.
The vast majority of personnel are male (87 percent), and a large majority are White
(64 percent). 27 percent of enlisted personnel are Black while 9 percent of officers are
Black. Smaller percentages of the sample are Asian or of a mixed or unknown race (the
’Other race’ category).
11The military compensates certain occupations above basic pay for the nature of the job (e.g., accepting
more risk), and some personnel receive periodic bonuses to renew their employment contract for a certain
number of years. We do not observe enough detail in our data to determine these additions to basic pay.
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Most of the sample is married (82 percent), and most have at least one dependent (88
percent). The average number of dependents (including those who have zero dependents)
is about 2.5. The Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) is a measure of cognitive abil-
ity, and is taken by all enlisted personnel (but not officers) upon entering the military.
The AFQT is a percentile score that reflects the distribution of test scores in the current
population of youth that have taken the test.12
Overall, 5 percent of the sample has a graduate degree (a masters, professional degree,
or a doctorate), 21 percent have a college degree (bachelors or associates) as their high-
est educational attainment, and 73 percent has only a high school diploma (traditional or
high-school equivalent certificate). The distribution of educational attainment is very dif-
ferent between officers and enlisted personnel, however, reflecting the fact that a college
degree is generally required to become an officer and the military often sends officers to
obtain post-graduate degrees.
5 Methodology and Results
5.1 Methodology
We explore the correlates of choosing Redux over High-3 through a simple model
which expresses Reduxi, an indicator of individual i choosing Redux over High-3, as
function of the linear combination of the observable individual level characteristics Xi
and indicators for the year in which the choice was made, dt :
Reduxi = bXi+dt+ ei (3)
We include the year-of-choice indicators in order to allow for secular trends in Redux
take-up over time. In practice, we estimate this relationship with a probit model to facil-
itate the calculation of implied personal discount rates. Note that our data is not a panel;
rather, it is a single cross section, yet contains individuals who made the retirement choice
in different years (i.e., 2001, ... , 2007).
5.2 Results
Table 4 contains marginal effects from the probit model for the entire sample (column
1), as well as for enlisted personnel and officers separately (columns 2 and 3). Owing
partly to the large sample size, most coefficients in the pooled and enlisted-only models
are significant at conventional levels. In the officer-only regression, fewer covariates are
12For unknown reasons, 6,566 (about 8 percent) of the enlisted sample is missing the AFQT score. In
the regression analysis below, we include an indicator variable for this missing data to avoid dropping them
from the estimation sample.
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significant - this is partly reflecting the smaller sample, but it is clear that the magnitude
of the point estimates is also generally smaller.
Reiterating our observation in Table 3, column 1 shows that conditional on the observ-
able characteristics, officers are 13.02 percentage points less likely to take Redux than
enlisted personnel. Apparently, about two third of the raw difference in Redux take-up
between enlisted personnel and officers is explained by differences in observable charac-
teristics. The negative coefficient on officers could be partially due to the fact that 48.2%
officers have a graduate degree while 43.2% of them have a college degree, which could
help them better understand the concept of present values. The great majority of enlisted
personnel, 80.3%, have only a high school diploma. Alternatively, the higher qualifica-
tion of officers could make their transition to the civilian sector at 20 YOS easier. At that
moment, the disadvantage of Redux over High-3 is at its maximum.
To the extent that service members are forward thinking, the expected number of annu-
ity payments and salary at retirement should be important determinants of the Redux/High-
3 choice. We do not observe the expected number of annuity payments (i.e., life ex-
pectancy), but it is reasonable to hypothesize that age at 15 YOS is inversely related to
the expected number of annuity payments. Indeed, for every additional year of age at 15
YOS, enlisted personnel and officers are 1.14 and 0.41 percentage points less likely to
choose Redux, respectively. Salary is also negatively related to the propensity to choose
Redux, but as with age, the relationship is stronger for enlisted personnel than for officers.
Overall, for every $10,000 increase in salary, service members are 2.71 percentage points
less likely to choose Redux. The sign of this coefficient is consistent with the fact that
salary has a strong impact on the dollar advantage of High-3 over Redux. The magnitude
of this effect can be observed in Table 2 by comparing the present value of High-3 minus
Redux for officers and enlisted personnel. The former have a considerably higher salary
than the latter and, thus, face a much larger dollar advantage of High-3 over Redux.
As discussed above, the break-even discount rate is determined uniquely by the ex-
pected number of annuity payments and salary at retirement. However, the relationship
is not linear and there does appear to be some independent informational content in the
break-even discount rate: the higher the break-even discount rate, the less likely is the
choice of Redux. We discuss this finding in more detail below.
Relative to the Air Force (the omitted category), the service members in the Navy
(both enlisted and officers) and officers in the Army are less likely to take Redux, while
enlisted personnel in the Marines are more likely to take Redux. It is not entirely clear
what is driving service-specific differences, but one speculation is that informational cam-
paigns and/or advising by commanding officers vary across branches. Furthermore, the
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nearness of Marines to combat occupations might induce them to choose Redux more
than the other services.
In fact, enlisted personnel - but not officers - are more likely to take Redux when they
are in a combat intensive versus a non-combat intensive field. These retirement choices
were made in a time of war, and those in combat intensive services, perhaps especially
those enlisted personnel who are more likley to be ground troops, may value the lump
sum relatively more because it does not have to be repaid upon death in the line of duty,
while retirement benefits do stop upon death.13 To the extent that this relationship is
reflecting enlisted personnel’s subjective life expectancy, this result is consistent with
rational decision making under the life-cycle model of consumption. Similar behavior
has been shown amongst retirees timing of Social Security claiming (Coile et al., 2002;
Hurd et al., 2004).
Male enlisted personnel are more likely to choose Redux, while there is no evidence
of differential take-up by gender amongst officers. Relative to White service members,
Blacks are much more likely to take Redux: 12.4 percentage points more amongst enlisted
and 5.12 percentage points more amongst officers. Asians are not differentially likely to
take Redux compared to Whites.
Single enlisted personnel, compared to married personnel (the omitted category), are
less likely to take Redux. In both the enlisted and officer populations, divorced individuals
are more likely to take Redux than are married individuals.14 It is unclear a priori whether
having dependents will make a lump sum more attractive. We do in fact find a positive
relationship between the likelihood of choosing Redux and both having dependents and
the number of dependents. Service members with dependents may face credit constraints
and have to incur large expenses such as tuition or child care, in which case the benefits
of the $30,000 lump sum payment may outweigh the lower future annuity payments.
Amongst enlisted personnel, higher AFQT scores are associated with a lower likeli-
hood of taking Redux, but the effect is small in magnitude and of marginal significance.
For example, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of AFQT scores (from a score
of 43 to a score of 74) only decreases the likelihood of choosing Redux by 0.6 percentage
points. Educational attainment, on the other hand, is strongly and significantly associated
with retirement choice: amongst both enlisted personnel and officers, we find those with
either a college or a graduate degree are less likely to choose Redux than those with a
13However, there are insurance plans that cover the surviving spouse from the financial loss produced
by the death of the service member. For instance, for a monthly premium, the Survivor Benefit Plan pays
participants a fraction of the retirement payments in case of retiree’s death.
14The Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act allows state courts to consider service mem-
ber’s retirement payments as marital property that can be divided in case of divorce action.
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high school degree.
Finally, the indicators for when the choice was made demonstrate that the likelihood
of choosing Redux has gone down over time amongst enlisted personnel, but has stayed
relatively constant amongst officers (note the omitted variable is making the choice in
2001). One potential explanation for this trend amongst enlisted personnel is that in real
terms, the value of the lump sum payment under Redux goes down over time as it is
not adjusted for inflation. To be sure, this fact is reflected by an increasing break-even
discount rate, but it is possible that there is an additional behavioral response to a lower
lump sum payment. Another potential explanation for the over time decrease is learning
and dissemination of information.
5.3 Sample Selection
As mentioned above, our data is a selected sample of service members who choose
between Redux and High-3 at 15 YOS, since we only observe this choice for those mem-
bers who have already retired by October 2012 (the date our cross-section was accessed).
Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain data on those who made the decision and
are still working. The degree of sample selection is lower for older cohorts, as we ob-
serve more retirees every year. For example, for those that made the choice in 2001, we
observe retirements up to 26 YOS, while for those who made the choice in 2007 we see
all retirements at 20 YOS and only a few at 21 YOS.
This sample selection is summarized in Table 5, which contains the distribution of
YOS at retirement within our sample, by the year in which the retirement choice was
made. Looking down the columns, the numbers of members retiring are for the most part
decreasing. Also, see that in 2001, few retirements happen by the 26th year of service.
But, as mentioned above, we do not know the number of service members who made the
retirement choice, and are still in active duty.
A problem for our analysis is that the advantage of High-3 over Redux diminishes the
longer one stays in the military past 20 YOS. Thus, we would expect those who choose
Redux to retire later than those who choose High-3. One way to explore whether this
selection issue is biasing our results is to examine the earliest cohorts of our sample, for
whom we have had the most time to observe retirements. We thus explore those who
made the choice in 2001 or 2002, for whom we observe retirements up to 26 YOS. In
this sample, those who chose Redux had 21.35 YOS at retirement compared to 21.31
YOS for those who chose High-3. While this difference is statistically significant at the
six percent level, it is hardly economically meaningful. Furthermore, we re-estimate the
models shown in Table 4 on the sample of those who made the retirement choice in 2001
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or 2002. The results are shown in Table 6, and it is clear that the results are quite similar to
those obtained when using the sample of all retired individuals in Table 4. In particular,
all coefficients but one (being in the Navy) keep their original sign, and the statistical
significance remains essentially the same, despite the substantial reduction in sample size
(from 88,736 to 21,516 observations). While not conclusive, we believe this evidence
suggests sample selection is not particularly problematic for our results.
6 Estimates of the Personal Discount Rate
Using the technique suggested by Gilman (1976) and Black (1983), and implemented
by Ashenfelter (1983) and Warner and Pleeter (2001), the probit model we estimated in
the previous section can also be used to infer the personal discount rates implied by the
retirement choices. We do this experiment for all individuals in the sample and calculate
mean discount rates across different personal characteristics, as seen in Table 7. Overall,
the mean personal discount rate is 10.05 percent amongst enlisted personnel and 6.49
percent amongst officers. These rates are somewhat below the estimates of Warner and
Pleeter (2001), which might partially be the result of the significant explanation efforts
by the DoD regarding the advantages of High-3 over Redux. However, the association of
the personal discount rates with individual characteristics is largely consistent with that
study. For instance, discount rates are negatively related to females, age at 15 YOS, rank,
education level, singles, and not being in combat intensive occupations. We also find a
positive relationship between the estimated discount rates and being non-white, divorced,
the number of dependents, and being a member of the Army or Marine Corps. Finally,
we find that the discount rates are also negatively associated with the calendar year of
the decision. This result might be associated with the fact that the percentage of service
members choosing Redux is falling every year, as described in Subsection 5.2.
6.1 Are people making rational choices?
Fundamentally, the choice between Redux and High-3 reflects a person’s preference
for current versus future consumption. The break-even discount rate is a useful summary
statistic to explore whether people are making wise choices. If this break-even discount
rate is low, we would expect that the choice of Redux is more favorable. For example,
if the break-even rate is lower than the market return on an investment, then the service
member could invest the $30,000 in the market and be better off than taking High-3. Or,
if the break-even rate is lower than the interest a service member is paying on debt, he
could again be better off by taking the $30,000 now and paying off the debt rather than
taking High-3. Or, if the break-even rate is lower than the interest rate on a loan, and the
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service member wanted to borrow $30,000 at the 15 YOS mark, again Redux would be
more favorable than High-3.
The database allows us to study this relationship between break-even discount rates
and the Redux decision. Interestingly, we obtain some indirect evidence of rationality
regarding service members’ behavior. The Redux plan can be seen as a loan in which
we receive the bonus upfront (i.e., at 15 YOS) and then repay it through lower monthly
payments in retirement. From this perspective, the break-even discount rate is the interest
rate paid for the loan. Then, if we divide service members in groups according to that rate,
we should find that those groups facing higher break-even discount rates exhibit lower
proportions of service members choosing Redux. This is exactly what Figures 2 and 3
display. That is, we divide enlisted personnel and officers by deciles of the distribution
of observed break-even discount rates, and compute the fraction choosing Redux. In both
cases, deciles representing higher break-even discount rates exhibit lower proportions of
members choosing Redux.
Of course, all of the above explanations involve rational decisions. It is well known
that behavioral considerations may drive people to be myopic (discount hyperbolically),
and thus favor current consumption at the expense of future consumption even if they
would not want to do so in hindsight.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the retirement decisions of U.S. service members between the two
current plans: High-3 and Redux. While we show that in the vast majority of cases the
present value of High-3 is considerably larger than that of Redux, more than 40 percent
of service members in our database chose Redux. We also find that the probability of
choosing Redux is significantly related to most observable demographic characteristics.
For instance, females, officers, education, age at the moment of the decision, and being
single are personal features that strongly reduce the likelihood of choosing Redux. In
contrast, the probability of selecting Redux is significantly positively associated to being
non-white or divorced, being in the Marine Corps, and number of dependents. We also
find that these personal features affect the estimates of personal discount rates. For ex-
ample, officers, females, whites, single and older service members exhibit lower personal
discount rates. Finally, we provide some indirect evidence of rational behavior by service
members by showing that those who face higher break-even discount rates are less likely
to choose Redux.
What is particularly attractive of this study is that it involves actual decisions of about
90,000 people over large sums of money, in many cases exceeding hundreds of thousands
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of dollars. Understanding how these service members with heterogenous demographics
make retirement choices has important implications for public policy. For instance, it is
key in formulating retention policies that allow the DoD to shape the force as needed. It is
also fundamental in the design of new, more affordable and customized retirement plans.
In this sense, we find that the possibility to choose Redux implied savings to the DoD of
more than $2 billion in retirement payments, while it gave service members the flexibility
to choose over two alternative income streams according to their personal preferences.
Furthermore, the observed reduction in the selection of Redux over the years could be
(partially) reversed by small changes in the retirement plans, such as increasing the lump
sum and/or indexing it by inflation. These policy changes could be very attractive to
DoD given the large savings implied by Redux. Finally, given that the individuals in our
database have personal characteristics that make them representative of wide segments of
the U.S. population, the findings in this paper may also be appealing to firms in the private
sector attempting to create or modify their savings and retirement plans.
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Figure 2: Proportion of enlisted personnel choosing Redux by deciles of the distribution
of break-even discount rates.
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Figure 3: Proportion of officers choosing Redux by deciles of the distribution of break-
even discount rates.
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Table 1: Multipliers obtained by service members under High-3 and Redux for various
years of service.
Retirement(Plan 20 21 22 23 24 25 30 35 40 41
High+3 50 52.5 55 57.5 60 62.5 75 87.5 100 102.5
Redux 40 43.5 47 50.5 54 57.5 75 87.5 100 102.5
Years9of9Service
Table 2: The differential benefits of High-3 and Redux for service members of common
ranks at retirement.
5"percent 10"percent 15"percent 20"percent
O-6 354 48.25 $95,654 $30,659 $4,714 -$7,329 0.211
O-5 4,470 43.89 $116,564 $38,545 $8,404 -$5,274 0.200
O-4 4,808 42.52 $117,719 $40,094 $9,987 -$3,828 0.189
O-3 1,274 40.41 $91,291 $22,913 -$1,192 -$11,271 0.176
E-9 834 40.06 $89,702 $21,741 -$2,217 -$12,234 0.170
E-8 9,602 39.91 $79,696 $19,142 -$2,665 -$12,026 0.159
E-7 38,301 40.07 $68,749 $14,681 -$4,790 -$13,148 0.151
E-6 29,984 40.05 $58,400 $12,143 -$5,161 -$12,882 0.140
















Table 3: Summary statistics
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Age(at(15(years(of(service 20.0123*** (0.0007) 20.0114*** (0.0008) 20.0041*** (0.0006)
Salary(at(retirement((yearly,($10k) 20.0271*** (0.0025) 20.0208*** (0.0028) 20.0177*** (0.0020)
Break2even(discount(rate 23.5041*** (0.1779) 23.2063*** (0.1992) 21.4822*** (0.1334)
Army 20.0012 (0.0047) 20.0060 (0.0052) 20.0102* (0.0054)
Marines 0.0221*** (0.0074) 0.0104 (0.0082) 20.0000 (0.0070)
Navy 20.0472*** (0.0046) 20.0503*** (0.0051) 20.0137** (0.0056)
Combat(intensive(occupation 0.0349*** (0.0056) 0.0364*** (0.0058) 20.0064 (0.0090)
Male 0.0246*** (0.0053) 0.0272*** (0.0057) 0.0017 (0.0061)
Black 0.1192*** (0.0042) 0.1204*** (0.0046) 0.0512*** (0.0100)
Asian 0.0075 (0.0088) 0.0031 (0.0093) 0.0112 (0.0166)
Other(race 0.0231*** (0.0069) 0.0213*** (0.0073) 0.0070 (0.0092)
Single 20.0184*** (0.0064) 20.0204*** (0.0068) 0.0029 (0.0087)
Divorced 0.0672*** (0.0073) 0.0667*** (0.0076) 0.0356** (0.0139)
Has(dependents 0.0173** (0.0070) 0.0175** (0.0075) 0.0013 (0.0093)
Number(of(dependents 0.0403*** (0.0014) 0.0421*** (0.0015) 0.0099*** (0.0017)
AFQT(score 20.0002 (0.0001)
Graduate(degree 20.0993*** (0.0130) 20.0501** (0.0250) 20.0216*** (0.0076)
College(degree 20.0482*** (0.0046) 20.0491*** (0.0049) 20.0193*** (0.0060)
Made(choice(in(2002 20.0340*** (0.0091) 20.0376*** (0.0097) 20.0047 (0.0133)
Made(choice(in(2003 20.0738*** (0.0089) 20.0839*** (0.0096) 20.0078 (0.0128)
Made(choice(in(2004 20.0764*** (0.0090) 20.0870*** (0.0097) 20.0071 (0.0132)
Made(choice(in(2005 20.0989*** (0.0090) 20.1133*** (0.0097) 20.0010 (0.0145)
Made(choice(in(2006 20.1031*** (0.0093) 20.1161*** (0.0101) 20.0127 (0.0125)
Made(choice(in(2007 20.1039*** (0.0095) 20.1180*** (0.0104) 20.0086 (0.0132)













Table 5: The distribution of years of service at retirement within the sample of current
retirees, by year in which the retirement choice was made.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
20 1,628 8,977 8,873 9,034 8,433 7,981 7,932
(51.42) (48.92) (50.52) (54.04) (61.3) (74.75) (93.25)
21 448 2,768 2,709 3,224 3,195 2,440 574
(14.15) (15.08) (15.42) (19.28) (23.23) (22.85) (6.75)
22 338 1,921 2,099 2,682 1,950 256 0
(10.68) (10.47) (11.95) (16.04) (14.18) (2.4) (0)
23 184 1,596 1,775 1,642 178 0 0
(5.81) (8.7) (10.11) (9.82) (1.29) (0) (0)
24 321 2,476 2,025 136 0 0 0
(10.14) (13.49) (11.53) (0.81) (0) (0) (0)
25 156 555 82 0 0 0 0
(4.93) (3.02) (0.47) (0) (0) (0) (0)
26 91 57 0 0 0 0 0
(2.87) (0.31) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Total 3,166 18,350 17,563 16,718 13,756 10,677 8,506





Table 6: The correlates of choosing the Redux over the High-3 retirement plan for those
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En1re*sample 9.21% 10.05% 6.49%
Male 9.51% 10.29% 6.74%
Female 7.17% 8.33% 5.32%
White 8.01% 9.01% 6.14%
Black 12.40% 12.84% 9.09%
Asian 6.58% 6.37% 6.68%
Single 6.29% 6.71% 5.21%
Married 9.52% 10.45% 6.60%
Divorced 10.41% 11.01% 7.82%
0*K*3*dependents 8.37% 9.11% 6.07%
>*3*dependents 11.67% 12.82% 7.79%
<*34*years*old 10.91% 10.84% 10.33%
34*K*37*years*old 10.20% 10.40% 8.03%
38*K*41*years*old 6.42% 8.57% 6.11%
41*K*44*years*old 5.32% 7.17% 5.12%
>*44*years*old 2.10% 4.89% 2.56%
Army 10.17% 11.12% 6.29%
Navy 8.77% 9.10% 5.99%
Marine*Corps 9.76% 11.24% 8.70%
Air*Force 8.66% 9.93% 6.00%
Combat*Intensive*Occupa1on 11.10% 11.50% 6.18%
Other 8.98% 9.87% 6.51%
High*School 10.65% 10.47% 11.00%
College*degree 6.89% 8.28% 6.71%
Graduate*degree K1.45% 7.25% 5.55%
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